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THE TROJAN HORSE OF ELECTRIC POWER
TRANSMISSION LINE SITING AUTHORITY
BY
JIM Rossi*

Reform proposalspending in the US Congress would increase
federal and regional authority to preempt states in siting transmission
lines in order to allow the development of a high-voltage transmission
grd for renewable resources. This Article recognizes the inadequacyof
existing state siting authority over transmission but takes a skeptical
approach to expanding federal sitingjurisdiction as a solution to the
problem, and argues that the over-attention to transmission line siting
authority is a bit of a Trojan horse in the climate change debate.
Specifically, because it ignores the more difficult issues of how the
costs and benefits of transmissionare balancedandhow it will be paid
for, expandingfederal sitingjurisdictionalone will not remove barriers
to transmissioninfrastructureand may presentsome hidden problems
of its own. Legislative focus on enhancing federal authority over
transmission lines has confused responsibility for this issue, further
delaying federal administrators and regional bodies from taking
proactive approaches that they currently possess authority to
implement. Further,transmissionsiting authorityreforms can actually
undermine climate change goals if they do not contemplate regulators'
considerationof the full costs and benefits associated with a project.
Reforms must also assess how the costs of transmission will be
allocatedandpriced.Failureto do these things can make transmission
siting authoritya Trojan horse in the climate change debate-masking
fundamentalissues that could harm the climate and keeping reformers
from focusing on the more seious barriersfaced by the large-scale
development of renewableresources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Heightened attention to climate change has highlighted the need for
substantial growth in new, non-fossil fuel sources of electric power
generation. It is well recognized that a growth in renewable resources of
electricity, such as wind turbines, biomass, and large-scale solar, will be a
major component of any solution to the greenhouse gas problem.' One
barrier, however, is the relative isolation of many of the nation's renewable
energy resource riches; many opportunities for large-scale development of
renewable energy resources are located in areas that are geographically
remote and distant from large metropolitan areas in which the demand for
electricity is greatest.! Existing transmission infrastructure is not adequate
to accommodate new renewable resources in many parts of the United
States, and existing efforts to expand transmission are also not sufficient.3
1 CHARLES WEISS & WILLIAM B.

BONVILLIAN,

STRUCTURING

AN

ENERGY TECHNOLOGY

REvOLuTION 3-4 (2009). Renewable resources will be just one component of any solution to

climate change. It is well recognized that attention to new renewable sources of electric power
alone will not solve the problem with climate change, given the U.S. and world dependency on
fossil fuels as sources of energy. Id at 2-4. Any solution must also address existing carbon sources.
2 Cathy Cash et al., Senate Tries a Push for Big-Pi'cture Grid Plans, Though 'Shovel-Ready'
Projects Still a Question, ELECTRIC UTIL. WKLY., Feb. 2, 2009, at 1, 34-35. In this Article, I
distinguish between large-scale development and small-scale deployment of renewable
resources. Both are important. However, the transmission infrastructure that will be needed for
large-scale development of renewable resources is not required for smaller-scale applications of
these resources, such as individual wind turbines and solar panels on homes and commercial
establishments. Because most smaller-scale development is focused on reducing consumer
energy demand, not on the production and distribution of energy, see, e.g., The Renewable
Energy Res. Ctr., Vt. Dep't of Pub. Serv., Small Scale Renewable Energy Incentive Program
FAQ, http://www.rerc-vt.org/incentives/faq.htm#2 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (explaining the
reasons for developing small-scale energy in Vermont), I discuss smaller-scale deployment
below under the rubric of efficiency, conservation, and demand reduction initiatives.
3 Cash et al., supra note 2, at 35. It should not be ignored that, under the present system,
many utilities have invested in transmission upgrades to meet transmission needs associated
HeinOnline -- 39 Envtl. L. 1016 2009
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For these reasons, the Obama Administration and leaders in Congress
have given new attention to expanding transmission infrastructure for
purposes of serving a new phase of development of renewable power
sources.' A common metaphor used to describe such proposals is to invoke
the comparison to a superhighway road transportation system, such as the
interstate highway system that was financed and built by the federal
government in the twentieth century.5 With the interstate highway system, at
the outset federal regulators had a clear sense of where highways would be
located and could exercise the power of eminent domain where necessary to
acquire the property rights to build them. In a similar manner, most
attention in the debates. over building transmission lines has focused on the
issue of the legal authority for siting transmissions.' The determination of
siting-or the location of a line and its approval, including eminent domain
authority-remains largely within the hands of state regulators.8 Major bills
pending in Congress would increase federal and regional power to preempt
states in siting transmission lines. 9 To date, the largest debate surrounding
these proposals is between federal authorities, who see a need for
expanding federal power to preempt states, and state and local officials, who
wish to preserve their historical role in siting transmission lines.'0

with the development of renewable resources. The Edison Electric Institute estimates that its
members invested nearly $37 billion from 2001 to 2007 in transmission infrastructure
improvements for such needs. See EDISON ELEC. INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS SUPPORTING
RENEWABLE RESOURCES,

at iii (2009), available at http://www.eei.org/ourissues/Electricity

Transmission/Documents/TransprojRenew web.pdf. While not trivial, this amount of investment
pales in comparison to the hundreds of billions it is estimated that upgrades to the U.S. transmission
infrastructure will cost. BuildingtheSmartGnd,ECONOMIST TECH. Q., June 6, 2009, at 15, 17.
4 Cash et al., supra note 2, at 1, 34-35. Much of this effort also focuses on so-called "smart
grids," or more efficient and intelligent ways of transporting and distributing electric power.
Most smart grid efforts are focused on power distribution and metering. Rick Morgan,
Rethinking 'Dumb'Rates,PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2009, at 34, 35. However, some efforts involve
improving the efficiency and intelligence of high-voltage transmission. Building the Smart Grd,
supranote 3, at 15. A full discussion of these efforts is beyond the scope of this Article.
5 Renewable energy interest groups have used the superhighway metaphor in advocating
for expanded federal authority over the transmission grid. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N & SOLAR
ENERGY INDUS. ASS'N, GREEN POWER SUPERHIGHWAYS: BUILDING A PATH TO AMERICA'S CLEAN

ENERGY FUTURE 1, 4 (2009), availableat http://www.aweaorg/GreenPowerSuperhighways.pdf.
President Obama himself has also referred to "a national transmission superhighway that .will
connect our cities to the windy plains of the Dakotas and the sunny deserts of the Southwest."
President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 in Denver, Colorado (Feb. 17, 2009), available athttp://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/
DCPD200900087.pdf.
6 See generally Fed. Highway Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Interstate System Design,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadinin/interstate.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (describing
the history of the interstate highway system).
7 See discussion infraPart 111.
8 See Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels, Vision Without Site; Site Without Vision,
ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2003, at 23, 24; see also infranote 14 and accompanying text.
9 See infraPart Ill.B.
10 See ihfra Part IIL.B for a discussion of the common theme shared by solutions currently
pending before Congress.
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In this Article, I recognize the inadequacy of existing state law, but take
a skeptical approach to expanding federal siting jurisdiction as a solution to
the problem and argue that the over-attention to transmission line siting
authority is a bit of a Trojan horse in the climate change debate. Specifically,
because existing state laws ignore the more difficult issues of how the costs
and benefits of transmission are balanced in the interstate market, and how
new transmission will be paid for, siting jurisdiction alone will not remove
barriers to transmission infrastructure and may present some hidden
problems of its own. The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses
how state siting statutes can serve as a barrier to siting new transmission
lines for wholesale power markets and renewable sources, and discusses the
need for some legal solution to this problem. Part III discusses existing
federal law on the matter, highlighting how there is already substantial
authority at the federal level that remains underutilized and highlighting
pending reforms. The political rhetoric surrounding these reforms is highly
polarized between advocates for expanding federal authority to preempt
state eminent domain powers and advocates for retaining states' rights. Part
IV argues that continued legislative attention on enhancing federal authority
over transmission lines has confused responsibility for this issue, further
delaying federal administrators and regional bodies from taking proactive
approaches that they currently possess authority to implement. Further, as
Part IV highlights, transmission siting authority reforms can actually
undermine climate change goals if reforms do not contemplate regulators'
consideration of the full costs and benefits associated with a project. They
must also assess how the costs of transmission will be allocated and priced.
Part V concludes with the cautionary note that a failure to do these things
can make transmission siting authority a Trojan horse in the climate change
debate-masking fundamental issues that could harm the climate and
keeping reformers from focusing on the more serious barriers faced by the
large-scale development of renewable resources.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE STATUS Quo OF STATE TRANSMISSION SITING LAWS
In the twentieth century, the U.S. transmission grid was largely planned,
financed, and built by privately owned, vertically integrated utilities." As a
single firm that produced generation and owned transmission-and which
was regulated based on cost of service-the vertically integrated firm faced
little incentive to expand transmission for .any purpose other than to serve
its own customers." A firm owning transmission and expanding capacity
could be opening up its own power generation assets to new supply
competitors. Transmission congestion thus may have helped the firm to
maximize its monopoly power. Moreover, given that the "line loss" associated
with early generation, high-voltage transmission lines was fairly significant,

11 LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILrrIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FuTURE I11

(8th ed. 2005).
12 See id.(describing the pressures and incentives that motivated public utilities' actions).
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most utilities saw it as most economical to locate generation facilities fairly
close to customer demand, rather than hundreds of miles away.13
The infrastructure decisions of the vertically integrated utility, including
whether and where to build'transmission lines, were regulated by state and
local authorities. Today, about thirty states have "siting statutes" or
something approaching a state siting law, while many other states continue
to rely entirely on local land use, along with utility eminent domain powers,
to site transmission lines. 4 State siting laws have historically focused on two
distinct sets of issues: 1) regulators' determination of operational and
economic "need" for a transmission line, and 2) an assessment of the
environmental impacts of building a power line.' 5 This Part describes how
states addressed these two issues and highlights how existing state authority
has not been sufficient to address either competitive wholesale markets or
broader climate change goals.
A. Need Determinations
Historically, state and local regulators have focused on determining the
"need" for a power line before giving siting approval and extending the
power of eminent domain to an applicant. 6 The need determination at the
state level has historically balanced various interests within individual
states, with the primary motivation of protecting in-state customers and
ensuring that any new transmission line that was approved would benefit
them.' On the one hand, customers did not want to see utilities invest in
wasteful projects, and the need determination served to ensure that the need
for power transmitting over a new line was justified in light of alternatives,
including conservation and improved efficiency at the local level. On the
other hand, customers had an interest in seeing facilities expand in order to
enhance the reliability of the system serving the customers within that state.
New York's "need" determination statute provides an example of the
narrow historical scope of state need determinations. Persons preparing to
construct a major utility transmission facility are required to obtain a
certificate of environmental compatibility and public need issued by the

13 Line loss is largely a function of voltage on transmission lines. In 1995, line loss for the
U.S. transmission system was estimated at 7.2%. U.S. CIMATE CHANGE TECH. PROGRAM,
TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS FOR THE NEAR AND LONG TERM 34
(2003), available at
http://climatetechnology.gov/library/2003/tech-options/tech-options-1-3-2.pdf. New technologies,
such as high-voltage direct current transmission lines, promise much more efficient
transmission than existing technologies, but these lines have yet to be deployed on a wide-scale
basis. See id.
14 Brown & Danieis, supranote 8, at 23-24.
15 Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a ChangedMilieu. Evolving
Notions of the "Public Interest" in BalancingState and Regional Considerations,81 COLO. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1-6, 11-13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id= 1444111 (follow "Download" hyperlink; then follow "SSRN" hyperlink);
see, e.g., N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw § 126 (McKinney 2000).
16 See Brown & Danieis, supra note 8, at 24.
17 See id. at 24-25.
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Public Service Commission (PSC)."' PSC may not grant a certificate unless it
has found and determined several factors, including "the basis of the need
for the facility." 9 Need is not explicitly defined, and other factors to be
considered by PSC include the "nature of the probable environmental
impact, "2° the project's conformity with other state and local
laws and
22
regulations,2' and "public interest, convenience, and necessity."
Since such statutes were adopted in an era in which the vertically
integrated utility with a duty to serve customers was the norm,23 state
regulators commonly face a vrariety of limitations, including statutory
limitations, in what they consider in determining the need for a plant. Need
assessment is typically approached from the perspective of ratepayer
benefits, with an emphasis on native customers.24 Many states limit
applicants for "need" to incumbent utilities or firms possessing contracts
with incumbent utilities.1 Even where nonutilities can submit an application
to build a transmission line, many states do not extend the power of eminent
domain to nonutilities. For example, in Colorado only utilities are expressly
granted the ability to exercise condemnation rights;2 New Mexico similarly
permits only public utilities to exercise eminent domain powers;27 and in
Wyoming only utilities that obtained a certificate of convenience and
necessity (CPCN), may use condemnation.28
This state system for making an independent need determination for
transmission line siting may have worked well under vertical integration and
rate regulation. In this context, however, it also may have served little
purpose apart from allowing for an eminent domain approval. Since under
cost-of-service rate making most power transmission lines were included in
the retail rate base,2" state regulators could have disallowed the costs of
§ 122(1) (McKinney Supp. 2009).
19 Id.§ 126(1)(a) (McKinney 2000).
20 Id § 126(1)(b).
21 Id.§ 126(1)(f).
22 Id.§ 126(1)(g).
23 Brown & Daniels, supranote 8, at 25.
24 Since the need determination was made by state regulators-often the same regulators
approving cost-of-service rates-the benefits to in-state customers were a primary
consideration, while benefits to out-of-state customers were secondary or may have been
prohibited by state law. See infm notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
25 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 434-36 (Fla.2000).
18 N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAw

26 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 32-12-125, 38-1-202 (2008).

27 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-1-4 (2004). It should be noted, however, that New Mexico has
created the New Mexico Renewable Energy Transmission Authority (NMRETA), a state
transmission authority created for the express purpose of providing transmission service for the
export of the state's renewable energy generation. See id § 62-16A-4 (Supp. 2009). While the
NMRETA statute did not create any new powers of eminent domain, as an agency of the state,
NMRETA can, in fact, exercise condemnation powers in order to obtain needed right-of-ways. See id
28 Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-26-815 (2009). The Wyoming Infrastructure Authority may use
eminent domain powers to acquire right-of-ways for new transmission, although it may not use
those powers to acquire existing assets. Id. §§ 1-26-815 to -816.
29 See, e.g.,
Chales J. Cicchetti & Colin M. Long, A BriefHistory ofRate Base: Necessary
Foundation or Regulatory ALisfit PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 2006, at 42, 42-43 (describing the
method of setting utility rates).
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uneconomic transmission that, on balance, did not benefit customers.
Rate hearings may have provided a forum for regulators balancing the same
interests as in a need proceeding, but a determination of need was a way for a
utility to obtain preapproval for its proposed facilities independent of a rate
hearing; apart from this, the only other benefit of the process was to allow the
successful utility applicant to exercise the power of eminent domain.
B. EnvironmentalConcerns
State transmission siting laws also typically pay some attention to
environmental impacts. However, since eminent domain is the main legal
significance of a siting approval, the focus of environmental concerns is
commonly limited to local environmental impacts. New York's statute, for
example, requires regulators-in addition to determining the nature of the
probable environmental impact-to make a finding that the facility
"represents the minimum adverse environmental impact," with a focus on
"the effect[s] on agricultural lands, wetlands, parklands and river corridors
traversed."30 One set of concerns relates emissions and pollution associated
with new transmission lines, 31 but this is seldom where debate over
transmission line siting is focused. Instead, the vast majority of the debate in
transmission line siting proceedings is focused on impacts to local
landowners and other not-in-my-backyard concerns.
In many recent siting proceedings, the environmental and land owner
opposition to a proposed line has been formidable, resulting in frequent
delays to a project and sometimes to the project never being built. For
example, several years ago the state of Connecticut strongly opposed the
Cross-Sound Cable, a twenty-three mile merchant (nonutility) transmission
line that was proposed to allow Long Island Power Authority to import
power from New Haven, Connecticut. 2 Connecticut regulators cited
environmental concerns in support of their opposition to the project, such as
impacts on shellfish beds and dredging operations in the New Haven
Harbor,' even though it was established that the project complied with the
minimal requirements in all state siting and environmental statutes.3
Connecticut's attorney general, backed by environmental interest groups
and a major incumbent utility serving Connecticut customers (Northeast
Utilities, which owns an older, parallel transmission line), aggressively
opposed state approval of the project and threatened litigation if the Cross-

30 N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 126 (McKinney 2000).
31 Id
32 Regonal Energy Reliability and Security: DOE Authority to Energize the Cross Sound
Cable: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Energy andAir Quality, House Comm. on Energy and

Conmmerce, 108th Cong. 55 (May 19, 2004) (statement of Jeffrey A. Donahue, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Cross-Sound Cable Company, LLC).
33 Id.at 59-60.
34 Linda L. Randell & Bruce L. McDermott, Chronicle of a Transmission Line Siting, PUB.
2003, at 34, 35-36.

UTIL.FORT., Jan. 1,
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Sound line was allowed to go live.n Eventually the parties entered into a
settlement and the project went live, but it is clear that environmental
opposition in the state siting process in Connecticut delayed the
transmission line's operation for several years.n
Not all new transmission projects facing state environmental opposition
have been as fortunate. In 2005, Southern California Edison proposed to
build a 230-mile, high-voltage transmission line from Blythe, California, to
the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, fifty miles west of Phoenix,
Arizona.37 The siting of the line was approved by California regulators.
Arizona regulators, however, rejected the proposal, even though it would
have been paid for by California ratepayers.n Emphasizing the ostensible
environmental costs the line would impose on Arizona at the expense of
California, they called the line a "230-mile extension cord."' Among the
concerns stated were environmental impacts on "everything from native
plants and wildlife to viewshed and archeological sites."4' As one Arizona
regulator bluntly put it, "I don't want Arizona to become an energy farm for
California. This project, if we approved it, would use our land, our air and
our water to provide electricity to California."42 Southern California dropped
its proposal in 2009.3
What is notable about these examples is that, while environmental
concerns were stated for opposing transmission in the form of costs to
residents in each state, there is little evidence that the state siting
proceedings provided an effective forum for balancing out-of-state benefits,
including benefits to the environment. As with the determination of need,
the assessment of environmental impacts has been primarily focused on the
in-state benefits of a project, rather than on a broader assessment of its
benefits and costs.

35 See Bruce W. Radford, Cross-Sound Cable Puts Feds on the Spot, FORT.'S SPARK, June
2004, at 1, 1-2 (describing action taken by Connecticut's attorney general); Linda Randell &
Bruce McDermott, Cross-SoundBlues,PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 2004, at 20, 20.
36 PartiesSet Deal to Energize Cross Sound Cable, INSIDE FERC, June 28, 2004, at 1, 1-2.
37 Press Release, Edison Int'l, SCE Seeks Approval to Build Devers Transmission Line
(Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.edison.com/pressroon/pr.asp?bu=sce&year=O&id=5484 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2009).
38 S. Cal. Edison Co., Decision 07-01-040 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Jan. 25, 2007), 2007 WL
951285, availableathttp://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word-pdf/FINALDECISION/64017.pdf.
39 S. Cal. Edison Co., Case No. 130, Decision No. 69638 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n June 6, 2007),
2007 WL 2126365, availableathttp://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000073735.pdf.
40 Press Release, Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, Regulators Reject "Extension Cord for California":
Commissioners Reject Palo Verde to Devers II Power Line (May 30, 2007), available at
http://www.energylegalblog.comifiles/ACCPressReleaseDeversHVote.pdf.

41 Id.
42 Id.(quoting Commissioner Bill Mundell).

43 Edison Drops Plan for Power Line in Arizona, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.con2009/may/16/business/fi-edisonl6 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009); S. Cal.
Edison, Southern CaliforniaEdison Will Not Seek License to Construct TransmissionLine in
Arizona at This Tlme, TRANSMIssION & DISTRIBUTION WORLD, May 18, 2009, http'J/tdworld.con/
overhead-taansmission/socal-edison-cances-transmission-license-0509 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
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C. MarketandEnvironmental Trends Challengingthe Status Quo of
State TransmissionSitingLaws
This Part describes how developments in wholesale power markets and
heightened attention to climate change render many state transmission line
siting laws obsolete to address problems in the U.S. energy economy. While
state transmission line siting laws may have worked adequately in the era of
the monopoly franchise and vertically integrated utility, in all but a handful
of circumstances they do not provide sufficient legal authority for state
regulators to expand transmission infrastructure to accommodate either
wholesale powers markets or to expand infrastructure to accommodate
renewable energy resources.
1. Developments in Wholesale PowerMarkets
Any discussion of state public utility regulation today must begin
against the backdrop of federal policies supporting competition in wholesale
bulk power supply markets. Wholesale power markets have been largely
deregulated since the mid-1990s, when the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) adopted open access policies for transmission in Order
Number 888." Congress has not opposed open access principles, and all
indications are that the Obama Administration will continue to embrace the
open access goals adopted by the Clinton Administration and continued
under the Bush Administration. Promoting competition in bulk power
markets has been a consistent characteristic of federal energy policy dating
back to the late 1970s. 4 It fully evolved into open access over the course of
FERC implementation of the Energy Policy Act of 1992.46 Under federal open
access policies, both utility and nonutility bulk power suppliers should be
able to compete on a more level playing field. This challenges the traditional
public utility regime under which state regulators operate, in which a
utility that owns both transmission and generation could have made
decisions to favor its own incumbent supply options over competitors'
supply options in making transmission decisions.47
As has been well recognized for a number of years, a competitive
wholesale power market assumes sufficient transmission infrastructure and
pricing policies to enable competitive wholesale power supply markets., s If
44 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996).
45 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC
POWER INDUSTRY: AN UPDATE 51, 51 (1996), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/

electricity/056296.pdf.
46 Id.at 56-59. In the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13201-13556 (2006), Congress
endorsed wholesale power competition and provided FERC with a stronger statutory basis for
mandating open access than did previous law. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.; supFa note 45, at 51.
47 Such decisions may have been made for both efficiency-enhancing and anticompetitive
reasons; the only intent here is to describe the reality of the movement toward wholesale
competition and its inevitable implications, not to defend it.
48 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposalto Deregulatethe Market for Bulk Power,72 VA. L.REV.
1183, 1231-32 (1986).
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transmission is physically and economically constrained, it is difficult for
bulk power supply markets to flourish. Absent the appropriate pricing,
physical constraints on transmission can preclude remote, nonincumbent
suppliers who do not own transmission from accessing customers.
Economic constraints on transmission can influence its pricing and
undermine the ability of new entrant bulk power suppliers to effectively
compete with established suppliers. Under the traditional vertical
integration monopoly paradigm, in which rate regulation was the norm,
utilities had little incentive to expand transmission for nonutility generation
sources that did not serve native load customers, since they could preserve
their monopolies by building just enough transmission to allow their own
power supply to reach their own customers." As a result, today, certain
areas of the United States, such as parts of the Northeast and parts of the
West, face serious transmission constraints for even existing power supply
resources. 5° In areas where transmission capacity is constrained and is not
priced for all suppliers to reflect congestion, wholesale power markets also
face serious barriers.
While state siting authority may have been a stable mechanism to
attract investment for transmission under the traditional public utility
paradigm, many state siting statutes and regulations have not been updated
to accommodate the interstate bulk power supply markets. As discussed
above, most states' siting statutes envision a determination of need based on
benefits to in-state customers.5' If a particular state's customers may benefit,
in terms of reliability or price, from competitive bulk power markets, this
could encompass transmission expansion for this purpose. Under existing
law in most states, state siting authorities generally lack the ability to even
consider, let alone rely on, export and import opportunities in the interstate
wholesale markets as a basis for siting transmission lines.5 Two aspects of
state siting laws typically limit the ability of state regulators to consider
opportunities for renewable power export and import opportunities in the
wholesale market in siting transmission lines. First, many states limit the
consideration of "need" to in-state benefits, rather than more broadly
consider the benefits of locating and building a transmission line. Second,
many states limit who can apply to site a transmission line."

49 Gail E. Tverberg, The US ElectricGrid Wil It Be Our UndoLg., On DRUM, May 11, 2008, at 2,
available athttp'//www.theoildrurrcom/pdf/theoildrum_3934.pdf. The effect of constraining the grid
to preserve monopoly power has a number of byproducts that are environmental and
technological as well as economic. See id. at 4. Failure to facilitate access not only favors
incumbent utilities, it also tends to favor incumbent generating units. The result is often
extended lives for older, "dirtier" generators, and barriers against optimal use of newer, more
efficient units. Id. For that reason, it can also be a barrier to the full utilization of new
renewable energy generating plants.
50 Id at 4-7.
51 See, e.g, N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 126 (McKinney 2000); see also supra Part II.A.
52 Brown & Rossi, supranote 15 (manuscript at 16).
53 Id (manuscript at 10-13); W. INTERSTATE ENERGY BD., SUMMARY OF STATE TRANSMISSION
SITING LAW IN THE WESTERN INTERCONNECTION (2009), availableathttp://www.westgov.org/wieb/

transmission/other/siting-chart.pdf.
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Many of the criteria siting statutes instruct state regulators to focus on
benefits to in-state customers and do not include benefits to out-of-state
customers or to the wholesale supply market.' Indeed, that traditional
scenario has come under enormous stress in the face of the emergence of
competitive bulk power markets, in which functional and corporate
unbundling and the movement away from vertical integration has been
emphasized.55 Put simply, the state-specific review of need is less meaningful
in the context of multistate markets. An excellent example of this change is
the question of what constitutes need in a competitive market. In a vertically
integrated monopoly model, the requirement to show need not only
constituted a possible justification for whatever environmental or other
degradation might occur, it also protected consumers from having to pay for
capacity in excess of what was required to adequately and reliably serve
them. In a competitive market, on the other hand, where supply and demand
drives prices, and where consumers are not obligated to pay all of their
suppliers' prudently incurred costs, excess capacity is (at least from a
consumer perspective) a positive factor in driving down prices. From the
opposite perspective, existing generators are likely to challenge proposed
new generating plants or new- transmission, which will enable more
generation to access more markets because of the fear that new entrants
will drive down prices.56
The fundamental question faced by siting officials in today's
environment is what constitutes need in a competitive market. It is a
seemingly simple question, but in fact it is quite complex. At the extreme, it
calls into question any requirement at all that state regulators assess the
need for transmission lines in a market, in which supply and demand, not
centralized decision makers, are better positioned to determine need." For
states that view themselves as exporters of energy into a bulk power market,
does the old paradigm, that need be determined in the context of what is
required to serve the consumers in a given state, get replaced by a new
paradigm that sees need in the broader context of the robustness of
competition and the overall economic development of the state? Similarly,
how does one determine need in the context of building new transmission to
enable clean renewable energy to displace existing carbon emitting
54 Brown & Rossi, supra note 15 (manuscript at 11-13); see, eg, N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 126
(McKinney 2000).
55 Brown & Rossi, supra note 15 (manuscript at 15-17).
56 Vertically integrated utility incumbents have very powerful economic incentives not to
build transmission that would expose them to more competition. It is for that reason that in
areas of the United States where there are established Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs), much transmission planning has been taken out of the hands of utilities and vested in
the RTOs and their constituent processes. See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 810, 811 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (explaining FERC's reasons for adopting
RTO regulations); see also Press Release, N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Planning Key to Addressing
Energy Needs (Aug. 27, 2009), availableat http.//www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/newsroon/press_
releases/2009/PlanningKey to_AddressingEnergyNeeds_08272009_FINALpdf (describing one
RTO's planning for future electricity needs).
57 For discussion of the argument that state officials might dispense with a traditional need
determination in siting proceedings, see Brown & Rossi, supranote 15 (manuscript at 12-13).
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generation that may yet have many years of useful life? For coal-electric,
power-producing states that are also resource rich, that is a particularly
vexing problem, since the net effect of allowing the renewable displacement
of coal could well have adverse effects on employment and the overall
economy within the state, thereby calling into question how such a state
should define its own economic development for purposes of need
assessment in a siting proceeding. One further query worth mentioning is the
geographic context within which siting officials in one state should consider
need in another state. It is the same issue that individual states face when
local officials have siting powers that impact an entire state, only now it is
the question of an individual state making decisions that impact an entire
multistate region.
Nationally, states vary widely on how parochial their siting statutes and
practices are, but at least one case from Massachusetts held that the state's
Energy Facilities Siting Board was without authority to site a line within the
state unless the entirety of the benefits of the transmission line accrued to
in-state consumers.58 Some twenty years earlier, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that eminent domain could not be exercised in the state by a
multistate utility that served Mississippi customers because some of the
beneficiaries of the line for which condemnation powers were being used
were out of state. 9 While not all states take such parochial points of view,
the issue of out-of-state benefits can be legally and politically problematic
for state siting officials.
Multistate power markets were not the main priority of legislators in
enacting most state siting statutes, if they were even contemplated by
legislators at all. However, today, given the increasing interdependence of
states' energy supply and demands in many regions of the United States, and
the constant significance of reliability in discussions of need in siting
proceedings, it is difficult to imagine siting authorities not giving any
consideration to the nature of the interconnected grid. It is, of course, self
evident that consideration of needs for other states by siting a line in one's
own state is not simply a selfless act of benevolence by the state taking
those benefits into account. Rather, it may well be a decision taken to
promote a state's economic self interest not only as a seller of energy but
also potentially as a buyer of energy, and a recognition of interdependence
for reliability. On the other hand, opponents of siting a particular line could
and frequently do contend that siting regulators are creatures
of narrow
6
statutes and cannot go beyond the precise letter of the law.
Also looming over this issue is the possibility of federal preemption. In
stark political terms, the more parochial the viewpoint state siting officials
take, the more likely it is that Congress will preempt their authority.1
58 Point of Pines Beach Ass'n v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 644 N.E.2d 221, 223-24
(Mass. 1995).
59 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 112-13 (Miss. 1984).
60 Pointof PinesBeach Ass'n, 644 N.E.2d at 223-24.
61 This may happen through either the express or the implied preemption doctrine under
the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause, or through judicial application of the Commerce
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Certainly, there is the precedent of states preempting the powers of local
governments in siting for similar reasons.62 Some states have evolved on
these issues, from not wanting to be the energy farms for giant "energy
sinks" (e.g., California) to, in some cases, seeing real benefits to becoming
an energy farm.u Putting ironies aside, in the absence of statutory change,
the degree of flexibility given to siting authorities to determine their scope of
discretion in looking at their own state's economic development and the
nature of market opportunities in serving the needs of consumers in another
state, as opposed to the more traditional weighing of local impacts versus
statewide or system-wide benefits, depends ultimately on how much
discretion the courts are willing to provide to siting officials.6
State regulators making need determinations in the current
environment might be on their firmest legal ground under their own
statutory authority where a link can be established between a transmission
line and the economic development policy of a state. The import of power
may contribute to economic development by diversifying power supply
options, creating downward pressures on price, providing customers greater
reliability, and contributing to general economic growth in ways that benefit
customers. In addition, and of perhaps greater economic. growth
opportunity, competitive bulk power supply options present many
opportunities for resource rich states to export power. Such a state might
rely on the benefits to its own economy and customers to expand
transmission within its own state, but under existing state siting statutes, the
consideration of benefits may end at its own borders if a neighboring or
adjacent state is not willing to expand transmission for the same reasons.
For such states, the failure of an adjacent or neighboring state to site a
facility will limit the ability to export resources and can potentially skew
interstate bulk power supply markets.
A second significant legal limitation in state siting statutes is that many
states limit siting applications or only offer the full range of benefits of siting
approval, including eminent domain powers, to utilities."' For example, if a
state is asked to site a transmission line on behalf of an out-of-state
applicant, including an out-of-state utility-using the wires in the state solely
for the purpose of transmission-some state regulators lack authority to
even consider the application unless the out-of-state applicant is willing to
take on the obligations of an incumbent utility.M Other states limit eminent
Clause's dormant or "negative" limitations on a state adopting and enforcing regulations that
discriminate against out-of-state producers.
62 PointofPinesBeachAssn,644 N.E.2d at 222-24.
63 See, e.g, Daniel W. Meek, Pacific Northwest Conversationfor California: The Mutual
Benefits of Long-Term Cooperation, 13 ENVTL. L. 841, 843-44 (1983) (describing Northwest
states' provision of power to California).
64 For the argument that federal preemption authorizes state officials to take into account
need aspects of the wholesale market, and does not limit state officials to in-state benefits, see Jim
Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: Re-Imagining the Role of
Courts in ResolvingFederal-StateSiting Impasses,15 DuKE ENVTL L.& POL'Y F. 315,328-29 (2005).
65 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
66 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 39 Envtl. L. 1027 2009

1028

ENVIRONMENTAL LA W

[Vol.39:1015

domain powers to utilities with an obligation to serve in-state customers."'
With the emergence of wholesale competition, however, new players have
entered the market. Merchant transmission companies, and even
generating companies that want to build their own interconnections, are
now viable business models being pursued in electricity markets in the
United States and elsewhere."
For states interested in using their own resources for the export of
energy, or for importing energy for the benefit of their consumers and
economies, the attraction of capital to the transmission business would be
facilitated if the investment could be sought from a broader pool of capital
than simply in-state utilities.0 In fact, utilities may well be unwilling to make
transmission investments that others might find attractive. The reasons why
utilities might be reluctant to make transmission investments that others are
willing to make include a desire to restrict or reduce competition, a capital
impairment of some sort, inadequate regulatory incentives, an unwillingness
to use up political capital or public goodwill, or perhaps simply the demands
on their capital budget are such that some transmission projects are of a
lesser priority to them than they might be to others. Even where states
allow nonutilities to apply to site transmission lines, they take a far more
restrictive position in regard to the use of eminent domain to acquire the
right-of-way. 0
In terms of advancing states as developers and exporters of renewable
energy resources, the ability of both utilities and nonutilities to receive siting
permits for transmission is, for the reasons noted above, advantageous. Not
only does permitting nonutilities to invest in transmission open access to
new capital, it also, for reasons discussed below, removes the question of
building transmission for exporting energy from the complexities of local
utility rate making and related cost or risk allocations.

67 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
68 For example, the Cross Sound Cable, discussed above, was not built by a utility, but was
built by merchant investors. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
69 There may be a question in some states if, simply by virtue of operating a transmission
line, a company must register as a utility in a state because of the nature of its business.
See e.g, WYo. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-101(a) (2009) (defining a utility as "every person that owns,
operates, leases, controls or has power to operate, lease or control ... [a]ny plant, property or
facility for the generation, transmission, [or] distribution ... for the public of electricity"
(emphasis added)). This Article does not explore that issue because the primary focus is on
whether someone other than the local incumbent utility can seek approval to site new line. If
obtaining that approval, ipso facto, makes them a utility, it is not particularly relevant to issues
being explored in this Article, other than to note that some investors, for a variety of reasons,
might be deterred because they do not wish to be subjected to state utility regulation. It should
also be noted that even if a transmission company is not state regulated, it is almost inevitably
subject to FERC jurisdiction. See Erich W. Struble, Comment, National Interest Electric
Transmission Corridors. Will State Regulators Remain Relevant, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 575,
582-83 (2008) (describing FERC's broad regulatory authority).
70 See generally Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid" A New Era in
Transmission Siting Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (2005) (discussing the restrictions of
eminent domain and right-of-way on states when siting new transmission lines).
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2. HeightenedAttention to Climate Change
Heightened attention to climate change is another development that is
challenging the traditional public utility model and its accompanying
understanding of the public interest in siting. Many opportunities for largescale development of renewable energy resources, such as wind turbine
farms and solar thermal fields, are geographically distant from a large-load
customer base. Wind turbines in North Dakota, for example, are physically
distant from customers in large metropolitan areas such as Chicago.
T. Boone Pickens has highlighted the need to build massive transmission
infrastructure to allow development of new wind turbine fields in Texas
since, without such infrastructure, generating facilities are isolated and
unable to reach customers." Likewise, precious wind resources in the
Dakotas and the Rockies will only be able to reach customer bases if a
massive new transmission infrastructure is built.72
As with wholesale markets, apart from the occasional nod to renewable
portfolio standard (RPS) goals, most state siting statutes do not explicitly
contemplate the consideration of climate change and renewable energy
goals in siting. To begin with, the need determination by regulators in most
states historically defines the "need" for power based on a specific physical
definition of what is required to provide service to customers.73 To the extent
environmental impacts may be taken into account in state siting
proceedings, historically these are limited to local land use impacts or to
local pollution. 4 In contrast to a physical and economic claim of need to
benefit in-state customers, climate change presents a "new" need for
transmission-one that is based on a claim of need to benefit out-of-state
suppliers, new entrant energy supply firms, and out-of-state customers,
whose plans are consistent with meeting environmental policy objectives. In
addition, the environmental aspects of siting transmission to address climate
change goals challenge the parochial, more narrowly (i.e., local) defined
interests most state siting statutes focus on. While states do take into
account traditional environmental harms, these are frequently limited to
local environmental harms such as conventional pollutants and their impact
71 T. Boone Pickens proposed building as many as 4000 megawatts of wind turbines in the state
of Texas. One acknowledged barrier to developing such a large wind turbine project is the lack of
transmission lines in areas of the state that have strong wind resources. Elizabeth Souder, T Boone
Pickens PlansPowerPlay with Huge Texas Panhandle Wind Farm, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 15,
2008, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dwsdn/latestnews/stories/DN-pickenswind-15bus.
ART.State.Editionl.4687df7.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
72 Green Power Express has proposed building such a facility in the Midwest, to serve
portions of North Dakota, Minnesota, south Dakota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Indiana. See
ITC Holdings Corp., The Green Power Express, http://www.itetransco.conVprojects/
thegreenpowerexpress.htnl (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (describing the proposed project); see
also Matthew L. Wald, Giving the Gid Some Backbone, Sci. AM. EARTH 3.0, Apr. 6, 2009, at 52, 52
(describing remoteness of certain renewable energy resources).
73 See, e.g., Jeanne B. Curtin, Recent Developments in Land Use and Environmental Law,
16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 265, 279 (2001) (reviewing Florida statute that determines need by
assessing in-state customer demand).
74 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-9-3a (Supp. 2004).
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on a state's population of localized concerns. 5 Broader out-of-state interests
in mitigating the future harms associated with the energy economy are
simply beyond the scope of most state siting statutes, and few statutes have
been updated to explicitly take into account an increased dependence on
renewable resources to address climate change concerns. 6 This is of
particular significance given that, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,77 the impacts of
climate change are global, not concentrated locally or within an individual
state's borders.'
States have been leaders in adopting climate changes reforms,
particularly given inaction at the federal level. States like California have
been innovators, enacting climate change regulations that are ambitious in
both their goals and their scope. 9 However, states have not been as
innovative in addressing climate change impacts in the context of electric
power transmission. No state nationally appears to require siting officials to
consider carbon emissions or other broader air quality issues, as opposed to
local, or in-state, impacts that they are generally required to consider, in
making decisions to plan or site transmission. No statute even references
climate change, or, for that matter, any out-of-state environmental effects in
that regard. None make direct reference to the impact that a proposed line
would have on the resource mix being used to generate energy.
About twenty-five states have RPS goals, which are designed to
promote utility use of renewable sources as an alternative to fossil fuels.0
The typical RPS requires a utility to certify that a certain percentage of the
power it is supplying to customers comes from renewable sources.' Some
states supplement this with a renewable energy credit (REC) system, in
which a utility can establish compliance with a goal by purchasing credits
rather than generating or purchasing power from renewable sources." While
it may promote some renewable power and climate change goals,3 a state
75 For example, New Mexico explicitly contemplates the consideration of local
environmental impacts. Id.
76 See Laura Koch, Comment, The Promise of Wave Energy 2 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVrL. L.J.
162, 190-91 (2008) (discussing Oregon's legislative initiative for renewable wave energy).
77 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
78 See id at 521. See generallyJonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally,Act Globally: The Limits
of.Local Climate Change Policies,155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962, 1964 (2007) (arguing that "think
globally, act locally" is not prudent advice for protecting the environment when "externalities
arise from wide-spread and geographically moveable sources").
79 See Kirsten Engel, State andLocal Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State
and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This SayAbout
Federalism and Environmental Law 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1016-17 (2006) (describing
California's climate change programs).
80 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE & ALTERNATIVE ENERGY PORTFOLIO

STANDARDS (2009), availableat http://www.pewclimate.org/sites/default/modules/usmap/pdf.php
?file=5907 (providing list of states with RPSs).
81 Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, ChangingMarket: The Impact of a National
Renewable PortfolioStandardon the US. EnergyIndust-y, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 49 (2008).
82 See id at 51 (describing how a national REC program might function).
83 It is seriously questionable whether all state RPSs have been successful at meeting their own
stated goals. Robert Michaels, A FedeialRenewable ElecticityRequimment. What's Not to Likeg
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having an RPS goal, or incorporating RPS-related considerations into the
relevant considerations for transmission planning and siting (such as
adopting a renewable "quota" for transmission), is not sufficient for
purposes of developing a state's export of renewable sources. Even where
RPS exists, it is applied to how the energy procured and/or produced by the
jurisdictional utilities for sale to its jurisdictional customers is generated,
rather than to what energy is produced within the state. To the extent states
permit trading of RECs, there is no need for actual renewable power to be
generated in the state or delivered at all to the actual purchaser of the
energy with green attributes, or possibly even into the state's borders at all.
There are no statutory admonitions to siting officials to be mindful of
environmental effects other than those within each state's boundaries, no
mention of assisting other states in meeting their RPS objectives, nor even of
taking advantage of the economies of scale in generation that might be taken
advantage of by selling energy across multiple jurisdictions.
It is interesting to note that as concerns rise regarding climate change,
interest in renewable energy escalates, and reliance on bulk power markets
for supply grows, the siting laws and criteria for considering the
enviromnental and other noneconomic impacts of siting new transmission
appear to be in a bit of a time warp associated with the old model of
vertically integrated monopolies, indifference to the sources of energy, and
only local environmental impacts. Whether, in practice, siting officials can
move beyond that framework without further legislative authorization
depends not only on their initiative and policy objectives but also on how
much leeway they will be provided by the courts, or how much new
direction they will be given by their legislators. Certainly there are public
policy reasons for doing so, but siting decisions are governed by statutes
passed by legislative bodies, how siting officials administer those statutes,
and how courts interpret the statutes.
While most states continue to embrace their old transmission siting
laws, there is a modest spirit of reform brewing among state legislatures in
expanding the scope of regulators' decisions in siting statutes. While
transmission line siting authority in most states is insufficient to address
such concerns, some states have explicitly expanded the legal authority of
state siting bodies to consider climate change goals, or at least taken steps
to reduce carbon emissions. New Mexico has been a leader in this regard,
adopting the New Mexico Renewable Energy Transmission Authority Act."
While this statute does not expand state eminent domain power beyond
traditional utilities, it does establish a Renewable Energy Transmission
Authority Board for planning and gives it the power of eminent domain (not
as a new power, but simply as a consequence of being a state agency), the

POL'Y ANALYsIs, Nov. 13, 2008, at 1, 7 tbl.2, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-627.pdf.

While there is some basis for being skeptical of such state standards, the arguments that state
failures extend to any federal standard seems specious, given that states have been subject to their
own inconsistent and idiosyncratic enforcement policies as well as spillage from the interstate
wholesale market-neither of which presents a problem for a uniform federal standard.
84 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-16A-1 to -15 (Supp. 2009).
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power to approve tax-exempt bonds, and the power to approve charges to
pay for transmission projects.5 According to a state agency document, at
least thirty percent of any new transmission capacity must be for renewable
derived electricity."" New Mexico's innovative statute parallels the approach
of some other states. California has also explicitly authorized its state
regulators to include its renewable portfolio goals in transmission planning
and siting, including through the specification of competitive renewable
energy zones for transmission. 7 Texas has also endorsed the concept of
competitive renewable energy zones, designed to address in particular the
expansion of the renewable energy economy in the state."8
Such states seem to focus predominantly on promoting state-focused
goals and, to the extent that they incorporate broader concerns, they
generally speak in permissive, not mandatory, terms.89 For example, Ohio
regulators are authorized to consider whether a transmission facility "is
consistent with regional plans for expansion of the electric power grid of the
electric systems serving this state and interconnected utility systems and
that the facility will serve the interests of electric system economy and
reliability."' '0 Wisconsin explicitly authorizes consideration of regional plans,
but even more explicitly limits the focus on improvements to reliability to
Wisconsin customers."' To the extent such laws allow consideration of outof-state benefits, whether these considerations are analyzed at all remains
largely in the discretion of state regulators. 2 However, the interests of
individual states, and likely the perspectives of state regulators, do not
always align with broader regional goals. Consuming states, such as
California, see their main goal as diversifying resources beyond traditional
fossil fuels and sparking development of new energy startups.8 3 Producing
states, such as New Mexico, see their main goal as encouraging economic
development of a renewable energy sector and developing particular rural
85 Id §§ 62-16A-3 to -4.
86 N.M. ENERGY, MINERALS & NATURAL RES. DEP'T, HB 188: RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSMISSION
AUTHORITY ACT (2007), available at http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ECMD/LawsRegulations

ExecutiveOrders/documents/HB-188-RETA-fact-sheet-07.pdf [hereinafter FAcT SHEET].
87 See
Cal.
Energy
Com'n,
Renewable
Energy
Transmission
Initiative,
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reti/index.htn-i (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (detailing the interagency
California Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative).
88 Implementing details on the Texas plan can be found at Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex.,
Competitive Renewable Energy Zones, http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/electric/25.174/
25.174ei.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). The relevant statutory provisions are codified at TEX.
UTIL. CODE ANN.

§ 39.904 (Vernon 2007).

89 It has been observed that some states, such as Wisconsin and Ohio, explicitly authorize state
officials to consider whether siting a transmission line is consistent with broader regional goals.
See Struble, supranote 69, at 597 (describing Wisconsin and Ohio transmission siting statutes).
90 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.10(A)(4) (West Supp. 2009).
91 As part of their transmission planning process, Wisconsin regulators are required to
"conduct a study on identifying and relieving any constraint on an intrastate or interstate
electric transmission system that adversely affects the reliability of transmission service
provided to electric customers in [Wisconsin]." See WIS. STAT. § 196.494(2) (2009).
92 See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.10(A)(4) (West Supp. 2009) (providing regulators with
discretion); WIS. STAT. § 196.494(4) (2009).
93 Cal. Energy Comm'n, supra note 87.
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areas." There may be obstacles if consumer and producer interests are not
aligned, and in many instances producer interests are not sufficiently strong
in the renewable sector to support legislative reform. For example, in a state
that is neither a sink nor a source state, but rather is serving primarily as a
conduit for power produced and consumed elsewhere, there may be no
apparent in-state benefit to siting the line, and it is unlikely any interest
group in such a state could build a sufficient coalition to support passage of
legislation similar to that in New Mexico, California, or Texas. Even where
such legislation does pass, it will likely merely authorize, not require, state
officials to take into account broader regional goals.
III. THE MOVEMENT TO EXPAND FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER
TRANSMISSION LINE SITING
Congress has responded to some of the concerns about limited state
authority to expand transmission infrastructure by broadening federal
authority to preempt state regulators in siting proceedings. In the twentieth
century, when most of the U.S. power grid was planned and built, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) did not have any direct
power over siting of electric power transmission lines, 5 and the state
regulatory process was considered the exclusive forum for the resolution of
siting disputes. 6 In the 2005 Energy Policy Act,97 Congress gave FERC
"backstop" authority to expand transmission in limited regions of the
country facing transmission constraints." FERC has yet to use this
authority,9 and there is some question on how strong its powers remain
following a recent limiting interpretation by a federal court.'°° Proposals to
more extensively expand FERC's transmission siting authority, broadening
its preemptive powers over state siting proceedings, are before Congress as
a part of pending climate change legislation, which is supported in principle
by the Obama Administration.' °'
A. ExistingFederalLaw
In the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress amended the Federal Power
Act (FPA), °2 for the first time delegating authority to the Department of
86.
95 See Brown & Daniels, supra note 8, at 24-25 (describing state siting structure and lack
of federal oversight).
94 FACT SHEET, supra note

96 Id.

97 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
98 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2) (2006).
99 See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
100 See infra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
101 Wellinghoff Sees Big FERC Role Supporting Obarna Green Energy Goals, ENERGY
WASH., Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/com-memn/wellinghoff/12-30-08energy-washington.pdf.
102 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (2006).
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Energy (DOE) to designate National Interest Energy Transmission Corridors
(NIETCs) and to FERC to exercise some "backstop" permitting authority
over states within the NIETCs.'°u According to these amendments, DOE "may
designate any geographic area experiencing electric energy transmission
capacity constraints or congestion that adversely affects consumers as a
national interest electric transmission corridor."'1 In compliance with the
2005 Energy Policy Act, DOE completed its study of transmission congestion
in August of 2006, and in 2007 it published draft designations of the MidAtlantic Area and Southwest Area National Interest Energy Corridors, based
on the study.'05 The statute also requires the Secretary of Energy to consult
with the states and conduct a study of electric transmission congestion
every three years following the initial NIETC designation. 6
Although the scope of FERC's "backstop" authority is limited
geographically exclusively to the corridors specifically identified by DOE,0 7

103 Id § 824p(a)-(b).
104 Id. § 824p(a)(2). Section 824p(a)(4) provides specifics as to what the Secretary may

consider in designating the corridors. Generally, DOE may consider the economic effects of
inadequate or unreasonably priced electricity within the corridor and in the end markets served
by the corridor. Id § 824p(a)(4). It may also consider whether "a diversification of supply is
warranted," whether "the energy.independence of the United States would be served by the
designation," whether "the designation would be in the interest of national energy policy," and
whether "the designation would enhance national defense and homeland security." Id. Section
824p(a)(4) also allows the Secretary to consider whether "economic growth in the corridor, or
the end markets served by the corridor, may be jeopardized by reliance on limited sources of
energy, and [whether diversification of supply, energy independence, national energy policy,
national defense and homeland security would be served]." Id, (emphasis added).
105 Draft National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor Designations, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,838
(May 7, 2007). In October 2007, DOE issued its final designations of the corridors. National
Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992 (Oct. 5, 2007). A pending case
before the Ninth Circuit challenges the degree to which DOE can rely on renewable resources
in designating NIETCs. Brief of Petitioners at 17, Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Dep't of Energy,
No. 08-71074 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2008). The filing of this lawsuit is interesting because it points
out a schism among environmentalists in regard to building new transmission. At the risk of
being a bit simplistic, the debate divides the environmental community. The schism is
between those whose focus is primarily on air quality (including carbon emissions) and who
want to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, and those who are more focused on land and
water issues (e.g., wildlife and vegetation) and who are concerned about the proliferation of
generators (including wind turbines) and transmission lines across the landscape. Air quality
advocates want to see more wind generation and other renewable resources and want to
assure that there is sufficient transmission to link "clean energy" to load centers. Brown &
Rossi, supranote 15 (manuscript at 24-25). Air and water quality advocates, on the other hand,
prefer to see generation built closer to load centers and find barriers to the construction of
power lines useful in the achievement of their policy objectives. See Andrea Stone, Renewable
Energy Plan Creates Rift, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money
/industries/energy/environment/2009-09-07-renewableN.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2009);
Stephanie Tavares, Environmental Concerns Roadblock to Renewable Energy, LAS VEGAS
SUN, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/feb/06/environmental-concernsroadblock-renewableenergys (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). Thus, one group of environmentalists
prefer to facilitate the construction of more transmission, while another seeks to restrict it.
106 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1) (2006).
107 See Struble, supra note 69, at 579 (concluding that, practically, the 2005 amendments to
the Federal Power Act only constitfite federal preemption in certain states).
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there are also limits on when FERC can exercise it within the NIETCs.
According to the statute, construction permits for transmission within
NIETCs can be issued by federal regulators, irrespective of the traditional
state authority over transmission siting, if one of three sets of conditions are
met. First, FERC can override the state if the "State in which the
transmission facilities are to be constructed or modified does not have
authority to approve the siting of facilities,"'s or cannot "consider the
interstate benefits expected to be achieved by the proposed construction or
modification of transmission facilities in the State."'09 Second, FERC can
override the state if "the applicant.., does not qualify to apply for a permit
or siting approval... because the applicant does not serve end-use
customers in the State.""1 Third, FERC can override the state if a state
dommission with authority to approve thd facility either has "withheld
approval for more than 1 year,""' or has conditioned its approval so that the
construction will not "significantly reduce transmission
congestion in
2
interstate commerce or is not economically feasible."
If FERC determines that one of these five statutorily specified criteria is
satisfied, FERC may override a state commission and issue a construction
permit (which would include the power to exercise eminent domain in a
federal district court),"' but only if additional conditions are present.
Specifically, the facilities must be used for the transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce;" 4 the contemplated construction must be
"consistent with the public interest";. 5 it must be expected to "significantly
reduce transmission congestion in interstate commerce and protect[] or
benefit[] consumers"; 1 6 it must be "consistent with sound national energy

policy" and be expected to "enhance energy independence";" 7 and finally, it
must be expected to "maximize, to the extent reasonable and economical,
the transmission capabilities of existing towers or structures." 8 To date,
only one application to exercise FERC's backstop authority has been
received by FERC; that application was withdrawn, however,9 and the agency
has yet to exercise its backstop authority in any single case.1

108

16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).

109 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(A)(ii).

110 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(B).
111 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i).
112 Id. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(ii).
113 Id. § 824p(e).
114 Id. § 824p(b)(2).
115 Id. § 824p(b)(3)
116
117
118

Id. § 824p(b)(4).
Id. § 824p(b)(5).
Id § 824p(b)(6).

119 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Transmission Line Siting Prefiling
Requests, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/siting/prefing-req.asp (last visited
Nov. 15, 2009).
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B. ProposedReforms
Despite Congress' expansion of transmission siting authority in 2005,
there is considerable concern that FERC's authority over transmission may
not be sufficient to allow transmission siting approval in certain areas of the
country.12 Concerns have focused on the fact that many renewable
resources, the development of which would depend on transmission, are
located outside of DOE's geographically-defined NIETCs.'' According to
FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, "We need a National policy commitment
to develop the extra-high-voltage (EHV) transmission infrastructure to
bring renewable energy from remote areas where it is produced most
efficiently into our large
metropolitan areas where most of this Nation's
12
power is consumed."
In addition, a recent judicial case issued a narrowing construction of
FERC's statutory authority under the 2005 amendments to the Federal
Power Act, calling into question the scope of FERC's authority in certain
instances. In PiedmontEnvironmentalCouncil v. FERC,'23 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted FERC's siting authority
narrowly.'24 Specifically, at issue in that case was the language of the statute
that authorizes FERC to override a state and issue a construction permit,
including the power of eminent domain, if a state commission with authority
to approve the facility has "withheld approval for more than one year."'20
FERC initially interpreted this statutory language to authorize the agency to
exercise its backstop authority in ingtances where a state regulator had
explicitly denied an application. 6 However, relying on its characterization of
the plain language of the statute, the Piedmont panel resolved the issue at
step one under Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Ine., 27 interpreting the language of section 216 of the FPA to preclude FERC
from exercising its transmission siting backstop authority where an
application to build a transmission line has been denied (as opposed to
approvalwithheld,as explicitly mentioned in the statute) by state regulators

120 Transnoission Infrastructure: Hearing Before the S Conun. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 111th Cong. 66-67 (Mar. 12, 2009) (statement of James A. Dickenson, Managing
Director and Chief Executive Officer, JEA) [hereinafter TransmissionInfrastructureHearing.
121 Id.
122 Id at 10 (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission).
123 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009).
124 See id at 309-10.
125 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C) (2006); PiedmontEnvti. Council,558 F.3d at 309-10.
126 fPiedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 311.
127 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron, of course, laid down a two-step process for courts
reviewing agency legal interpretations. At step one, a court first determines "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter." Id.at 842. On the other hand, if the court concludes that "the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific [question]," the court moves on to step two, at which
it defers to a reasonable agency construction of the statute in question ifit is permissible. Id at 843.
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within one year.' 28 The court reasoned that the phrase "withheld approval for
more than one year"' 29 does not, read by itself, include the "outright denial of
a permit application within the one-year deadline."' 30 The decision was not
unanimous. A dissent emphasized that the majority misread the language of
the statute and the 2005 amendments to the FPA, and that FERC's
interpretation of the FPA is entitled to Chevron step two deference. 3' In
September 2009, the Edison Electric Institute and others filed a petition. for a
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.'3 '
The Fourth Circuit's Piedmont decision involves only one of the five
statutory grounds that FERC may rely on in exercising its backstop
authority. However, some interpret the decision as seriously hobbling
FERC's ability to implement its backstop authority. ' 3 As Chairman
Wellinghoff stated, "[The Piedmont] court's ruling is a significant constraint
on the Commission's already-limited ability to approve appropriate projects
to transmit energy in interstate commerce."' 3' For example, the only section
216 proceeding initiated at FERC-Southern California Edison's application
to build the Arizona portion of the Devers-Palo Verde Number 2 project"'seems to involve a denial of an application (rather than a state withholding
approval), and it is unclear the extent to which any of the other criteria that
would trigger FERC backstop authority are present. In any event, FERC will
not get to decide the question(s) in that proceeding, since the company
has
36
decided to withdraw its application from consideration by FERC.
In response to such concerns, several proposals pending before
Congress would further expand FERC's authority to preempt state and local
land use decisions. The Senate took the lead in initial proposals following
the election of President Obama. A bill sponsored by Senator Harry Reid
(D-Nev.), the majority leader, would allow DOE to designate "national
renewable energy zones," based on locations that are capable of generating
more than 1000 megawatts of renewable energy. 3 7 His approach basically
retains the primary role of states in siting transmission lines, while

128 Piecmont Envt. Council, 558 F.3d at 320 (limiting the interpretation of the phrase
"withheld approval for more than one year" and reversing FERC's interpretation of the language
of the Federal Power Act siting backstop authority to include the denial of the applications).
129 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C)(i) (2006).
130 iedmontEnvtl. Council,558 F.3d at 315.
131 Id at 321 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
132 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, No. 09-343 (Sept. 17,
2009), availableathttp://www.nreca.org/Documents/PubicPolicy/SitingCertPetition.pdf.
133 In fact, it is questionable that it does so in a manner that will preclude the exercise of
backstop authority in most instances. FERC has other statutory grounds that it can invoke to
preempt a state, assuming the state does not deny an application and complies with those
specific criteria. See 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006). FERC and DOE also retain authority to expand
NIETCs. Id. § 824p(a)(2). Even after Piedmont, a significant amount of backstop power remains
with federal authorities.
134 Transmission InfrastructureHearing,supranote 120, at 11 (testimony of Jon Wellinghoff,
Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
135 The project is described at supranotes 37-43 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
137 Clean Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, S. 539, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
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expanding FERC's backstop authority in such areas. s A bill proposed by
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) has been approved by the Senate Energy
and Natural Resources Committee, which he chairs. 39 This bill would
replace state transmission siting altogether with regional siting entities
operating in conjunction with the Department of the Interior; however, an
amendment to the bill that was approved in committee severely limits the
ability of FERC to allocate the costs of new transmission for renewable
resources on an interstate basis.'4 °
In the meantime, the House of Representatives has adopted landmark
climate change legislation-the "Waxman-Markey" bill' 4 '-that,among other
things,4 endorses a regional transmission planning model and includes the
expansion of federal backstop authority over transmission.' The bill
proposes regional planning entities for transmission and puts in place a
system of FERC review of these plans for consistency with transmission
planning principles.'" These principles, which FERC would need to develop,
will "facilitate the deployment of renewable and other zero-carbon and lowcarbon energy sources for generating electricity to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions while ensuring reliability, reducing congestion, ensuring cybersecurity, minimizing environmental harm, and providing for cost-effective
electricity services throughout the United States.' 4 5 Other provisions expand
FERC's backstop authority, but the primary scope of the expansion of
federal authority in Waxman-Markey is limited to western interconnection
states and does not expand FERC's power over transmission for eastern
interconnection states, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Alaska, or
Hawaii.' 46 Under the Waxman-Markey bill, if a state fails to approve within
one year the construction and routing of an application that is consistent
138

Id

139

American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, S. 1462, 111th Cong. (2009).
See id § 121 (amending the Federal Power Act). As approved in committee,

140

Senator Bingaman's bill authorizes FERC to allocate the costs of new transmission projects,
although an amendment to this provision (known as the "Corker amendment") only allows
FERC to allocate transmission costs to customers once it determines "the costs are
reasonably proportionate to measurable economic and reliability benefits." Id; Peter Behr,
US. PreparesMore RegulatoryMoves in Case Climate Bills Stall, CLIMATEWIRE, Oct. 1, 2009,
http://www.eenews.net/ public/cllmatewire/2009/l0/01/2 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (noting that
the Corker amendment "would prevent FERC from spreading the costs of major new
transmission broadly across multi-state regions unless the commission could justify it by
showing specific economic and grid reliability benefits"). For discussion of how this kind of
measurable benefits requirement could severely limit the ability of FERC to allocate the costs
of new transmission for renewable projects, see iMinois Commerce Connission v FERC,
576 F.3d 470, 479 (7th Cir. 2009) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
141 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
142 Waxman-Markey also adopts a cap-and-trade program, to begin to price carbon
emissions, and adopts a national renewable energy portfolio standard. Id §§ 101, 311 (as passed
by House, June 26, 2009) (establishing the Combined Efficiency and Renewable Electricity
Standard and creating the Global Warming Pollution Reduction Program within the Clean Air Act).
143 See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
144 H.R. 2454 § 151(b).
145 Id.
146 Id.
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with a regional plan on file with FERC, rejects the application, or imposes
"unreasonable" conditions on the project, FERC may preempt a
transmission application and issue its own Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity;1 47 this overrules the effects of the Fourth Circuit's Piedmont
decision. However, since it is expressly limited in application to states in the
western United States, FERC's power to exercise backstop siting authority
will vary depending on which region of the country a state is located.
While federal reform proposals have generated a wide range of
solutions to state barriers to siting new transmission, the specific solutions
pending before Congress share a common theme. The common theme is to
expand federal (or, if not federal, regional) authority to preempt state land
use decisions to address the problem of state and local governments
withholding -the power of eminent domain for new transmission lines. While
state siting statutes do present some barriers, the near exclusive focus on
siting authority has also polarized discussion about these proposed reforms.
On the one hand are those who wish to significantly expand federal
authority to preempt state land use and eminent domain decisions to
promote new renewable projects. On the other hand are those who
advocate for preservation of state and local control of land use and eminent
domain decisions. There is little common ground between the two camps.
IV.THE TROJAN HORSE OF TRANSMISSION LINE SITING AUTHORITY
In the present situation, where states play a role and federal authority
seems to be expanding, there is no clear political accountability for
transmission planning and siting. Further, there is a risk that climate change
goals could be undermined if federal authority over transmission siting is
expanded without regulators addressing other issues. As argued in this Part,
it is at least as important that regulators address issues related to
transmission pricing. Failing to do so could result in investment in
transmission that does not serve the purpose of promoting renewable energy
sources, and may allow transmission expansion to crowd out efficiency and
conservation improvements. In addition, addressing pricing could solidify the
political strength of interests groups supporting transmission lines, including
developers and investors, to better lobby for reforms over siting and land use
issues at the state and regional level (as well as at the federal level).
A. Weakening PoiticalAccountability
Historically, transmission planning was largely conducted by the
vertically integrated utility, while siting proceedings were managed by state
and local regulators.'8 Transmission was (and for the most part still is)
financed in retail utility rates, which were approved by state regulators. 9

147 Id.
148 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
149

See infra Part IV.B.2.
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Under such circumstances, every developer and investor in transmission
perceived transmission line siting as purely a state or local issue. The siting
process balanced the. public interest by assessing the costs and benefits of a
transmission line, but its perspective focused primarily, if not exclusively, on
in-state costs and benefits.15 ° Transmission developers (primarily utilities)
worked closely with state and local governments, and to the extent that
there were state or local obstacles to transmission, utilities often negotiated
by agreeing to conditions to the siting of new transmission lines.' 5' There
was little focus on the interstate market or on environmental impacts and, as
described above, a larger focus on out-of-state benefits and costs was simply
not a part of the process.'5 2
The wholesale market and heightened attention to climate change have
challenged this traditional paradigm. Today, there is a recognition among
policy makers that an assessment of the costs and benefits of a new
53
transmission line must extend beyond the residents of any individual state.
However, in most instances state law and regulatory processes remain
serious obstacles to such considerations.'M The predominant political
solution has been to call for an expansion of federal power to preempt state
and local regulators. ' The expansion of federal backstop power retains a
dual system in which both federal and state officials will continue to play a
role. State siting proceedings remain relevant, but so also do the policies of
federal regulators. Increases in federal transmission line preemptive power
may promote greater uniformity between states, but to the extent state and
local land use regulators retain considerable input in the process, this
undermines any incentive utilities have to work with state and local
regulators to strike a balance that best fits state and regional needs. For
example, if it is expected that down the line an application for backstop
siting authority may be filed with FERC, a utility may not invest the
resources to work with state and local governments to reach agreement on
conditions related to a transmission line's size or location. In this sense, a
dual regulatory system for transmission line siting may undermine political
accountability and create even more uncertainty for investors.
The current approach to siting may not only reduce the incentives for
developers of transmission projects to invest in negotiating with state and
local regulators to bargain for land use conditions that can mediate the
adversarial nature of a siting refusal, it also could result in federal regulators
evading responsibility for the issue. For example, following the Piedmont
case, FERC itself contributed to the uncertainty by lobbying Congress for
150 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
151 See, e.g., THE BRATTLE GROUP ET AL., SURVEY OF TRANSMISSION SITING PRACTICES IN THE
MIDWEST 11 (2004) ("In South Dakota, public input hearings are mandatory but a formal
evidentiary hearing may be waived if all parties agree to a negotiated 'Terms and Conditions' for
a permit and the agreement is accepted by the Conmmission.").
152 See supra Part 1.B.
153 TransmissionInfrastructureHearing,supra note 120, at 11 (testimony of Jon WeIinghoff,
Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
154 See supra Part 1B.
155 See supranotes 137-44 and accompanying text.
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expanded authority and complaining that it lacks the power it needs to site
lines for renewable exports. 1" FERC Chairman Jon WeUinghoff, for example,
interprets Piedmont as limiting FERC's authority, even though it deals with
only one of five potential grounds FERC can invoke for preempting a state
decision not to site a transmission line."' This is somewhat puzzling, given
that FERC and DOE retain considerable power, even under the current state
of the law.' However, it does seem apparent that the focus on lobbying
Congress has led FERC and DOE to retreat from articulating a more
ambitious program for redesignating NIETCs and siting transmission based
on current statutory authority. 9
B. UnderminingClimate Change Goals
Moreover, an emphasis on siting may result in expansion of
transmission infrastructure in ways that actually undermine climate change
goals. There are two primary ways in which the expansion of transmission
capacity can serve as a Trojan horse for climate change goals. One is by
crowding out conservation and efficiency at the state level. The other is by
providing excess capacity that can be used to transmit power from dirty, low
cost sources.
1. Overrehanceon Transmission
The first significant issue is that transmission itself might facilitate
greater specialization between energy "sink" and energy "source" states.
While such specialization in a state's energy economy is not per se
problematic, it can result in a loss of control between the grid and the
sources of electricity it transmits. It also can crowd out other desirable
energy supply option programs if transmission is sited without attention to
broader efficiency and conservation objectives.
Matters are complicated by the physical fact that transmission for
renewable sources of electric power is not entirely fungible with
transmission for nonrenewable sources of power. Every power source has a
different level of dependability, based on its ability to provide firm, reliable

156 Transmission Infrastructure Hearing, supra note 120, at 8-10
Jon Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
157 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.

(testimony of

158 See supra Part III.B.

159 See generallyJoshua P. Fershee, MisguidedEnergy: Why Recent Legislative,Regulatory,
and MarketImtiatives Are Insufficient to Improve the US EnergyInfrastructure,44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 327, 331-32 (2007) (highlighting how there is limited authority for FERC and DOE to
address NIETCs). To be sure, there are some limits on the authority of both FERC and DOE, but
DOE may be able to draw on the discretionary criteria Congress specified in the 2005
amendments to the FPA to broaden approach the definition of NIETC's to include some areas
that lack transmission for renewables in the future. See supra Part JlI.A.
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power for consumers.' 6 Renewable sources of generating electricity in
particular are more likely to be unpredictable and unreliable to the extent
that their availability depends on wind and other weather conditions.'6' To
ensure reliability, the grid needs to have sufficient reserves in transmission
to accommodate possible surges, as well as quickly deployable backup
sources of power should intermittent renewable sources become
unavailable. Wind, for example, will demand more power lines and
substations than coal-fired plants, which provide a steady stream of
electricity. 62 If the wind is blowing hardest in Colorado, yet needed in
California, there must be lines available to transport the power. '6 It is for
this reason that it is widely perceived that a large increase in renewable
energy resources will not only require transmission lines in new locations of
the United States, but also will require more transmission infrastructure than
historically may have been necessary for fossil fuel sources of electricity'"
However, as an economic matter, expanding transmission on a largescale, and to larger degrees than would have been necessary in the past,
could easily backfire, undermining the very climate change goals it purports
to advance. As has been reported:
Complicating the debate, many proposed power lines that could carry
renewable energy to market could also end up carrying coal-fired power. An
improved national grid would end the situation that prevails at many hours in the
East today, when coal plants that can produce power cheaply sit idle while
cleaner natural gas plants are running full tilt, able to sell their more expensive
power because grid traffic is so bad that the coal power cannot reach the market.
That configuration costs consumers money but also reduces emissions of the
carbon-dioxide emissions that cause climate change. So contrary to expectations,
160 See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT GUIDEBOOK: VERSION 1.2, at 9
(2009), avalable athttp://www.nerc.com/files/ReliabilityAssessmentGuidebook-8-24-09-clean.pdf
(explaining characteristics of reliable power sources).
161 It is for this reason that many refer to such resources as "intermittent." See, e.g., id. at 45
(describing wind and hydropower as intermittent resources). In fact, the extent to which a
resource is firm is always a matter of degree. In addition, there may be technologies available,
such as flywheels for wind and thermal storage for solar, to help stabilize the reliability of
renewable sources of electricity. See id. at 38 (discussing reliability of renewable power
supplies); Lena M. Hansen, Can Wind Be a "f1irm" Resource? A North Carolina Case Study,
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 341, 378 (2004) (listing physical storage options for wind energy);
Gene Wolf & Rich Bush, Utiities Bulk Up on Energy Storage, TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION
WORLD, Aug. 2009, at 20, 21-22.
162 U.S. DEP'T

OF

ENERGY,

20% WIND ENERGY

BY

2030:

INCREASING

WIND

ENERGY'S

CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 93 (2008), availableathttp://www.20percentwind.org/

20percenLwindenergy.reportrevOct08.pdf.
163 See id. at 11 (discussing the need for expanded transmission infrastructure to transport
wind power); Christopher Martin & Mario Parker, Wind Promises Blackouts as Obama Strains
Grid with Renewables, BLOOMBERG.cOM, Aug. 7, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=washingtonstory&sid=arbHcz0ryME (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
164 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 162, at 93 (stating that an expansion of the
transmission grid is necessary to enable delivery of wind-generated electricity); Martin &
Parker, supra note 163 (stating that there is a need for development of the transmission
infrastructure to bring renewable energy from remote production areas to consumption areas).
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one effect of a stronger grid, although ardently sought by supporters of renewable
energy, could be to push costs down but nudge coal-fired emissions up.'
If the grid is expanded without attention to how economic decisions in
the allocation of transmission capacity are made, there is no guarantee that
it will be used by new sources of power generation as opposed to existing
plants. As a physical matter, electrons follow the path of least resistance,
and expanding transmission will simply allow existing generation sources to
reach new markets.lu Such expansion may benefit wholesale power
markets, but it will not necessarily advance climate change goals. Allocating
transmission capacity is no easy task. Since electrons follow the path of
least resistance, there is no simple way regulators can determine which
electrons will use which transmission lines. ' 67 The only effective way to
allocate transmission is by pricing it to reflect scarcity and various
opportunity costs'
Overbuilding transmission could have other consequences as well. In
particular, expanding transmission allows for more economical development
of large-scale power generation projects.lu As such, it can crowd out
efficiency, conservation, and other demand reduction efforts. Such
efficiency, conservation, and demand reduction efforts are largely managed
at the state level, where costs and benefits are assessed from the perspective
of in-state customers.'70 However, as we move towards developing a more
interstate grid, a regional approach may be the best way to balance
efficiency and conservation objectives. Transmission capacity for renewable
sources may take away from incentives that sink state regulators have to
improve efficiency, profiote conservation, and reduce the demand for
electricity. Sink states, such as California, 7 ' are net power importers and
should not be able to externalize their own poor policy decisions on other
states, such as source (or power exporting) states and energy transmitting
states, absent some showing that they are comparing the regional costs
and benefits of broader efficiency and conservation goals to the regional
costs and benefits of transmission line siting.

165 Matthew L.Wald, Debate on Clean Energy Leads to RegionalBattle over Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14,2009, atA13.
166 Katja Keller & Jorg Wild, Long Term Investment in Electricity: A Trade-Off Between
Co-Ordinationand Competition? 12 UTIL. POL'Y 243, 245 (2004).
167 Id.

168 See geneallyJames F. Wilson, Scarcity,MarketPower,andPrlce Caps in Wholesale Electric
Power Markets; ELECTRICITY J., Nov. 2000, at 33, 33-44 (discussing the relationship between
scarcity, opportunity cost, and market regulation in the context of electrical utility rate setting).
169 See PETER FoX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETITIVE

ERA 225 (1997) (discussing generators' need for expanded transmission for efficiency and
reliability purposes).
170 Struble, supra note 69, at 577.
171 More than 30% of California's electric power demand is imported from elsewhere.
SeeCAL ENERGY COMM'N, 2009 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT 2 (2009), available at

http://www.energy.cagov/2009publicationsCEC-100-2009-003/CEC-100-2009-003-CTD.PDF.
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2. The Need for CarbonNeutral TransmissionPricing
At core, these issues will not be solved until transmission is
appropriately priced in a way that allows various investors in power plants
and plant operators to make allocative decisions in their market transactions
regarding transmission. A major obstacle is that, under the current regime,
pricing is controlled almost exclusively by state regulators, not by the
interstate market.'72 State regulators build the costs of new transmission into
retail rates, which means that they are largely paid for by in-state
customers.'7 3 Since retail rate base is a limited universe of rate payers, '
there is not an effective vehicle at the state level to ensure that transmission
is priced so that those who benefit from it pay the costs associated with it.
Where there is a mismatch between cost allocation and benefits, it is more
likely that investors will be making suboptimal decisions about whether to
invest in transmission. The result could be under-investment in some areas
of the country, which does not allow sufficient incentives for expanding the
grid even if the siting authority problem is addressed. In other areas of the
country, over-investment in transmission may result, creating some of the
problems highlighted above.
At a broad level, if a significant part of the transmission grid is to be
preserved for renewable sources of electric power, there are two possible
solutions to this pricing problem. One solution is for Congress to link any
expansion of transmission authority to the adoption of a cap-and-trade
program that fully internalizes the social costs related to climate change in
the cost of carbon emission allowances, If the cost of electricity in the
wholesale power market reflects the full carbon costs associated with its
production, decisions about the allocation of the grid will take this into
account even if it is not reflected in the actual prices of transmission. While
there may be a way to imagine this as a matter of economic theory, it is less
likely when implemented in the political process where interest group
dynamics, rather than economic principles, steer carbon credit allocations.1 5
Even if Congress can garner the political will to pass cap-and-trade legislation,
it is highly unlikely that every energy resource will be priced in a carbonneutral manner (rather than a manner that reflects interest group dynamics).
172 Donald F. Santa, Jr. & Clifford S. Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs. Will the
ElectricIndustry Transition Track the NaturalGas Industry Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L.J. 113,
119-20 (2004).
173 See generally Susan Kelly & Elise Caplan, 7me for a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to
Reform RTO-Run Centralized Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491, 491 (2008)
(highlighting the burden of infrastructure needs and other costs on the consumer).
174 See Denise L. Desautels, Who Should Regulate the Siting of Electric Transmission Lines
Anyway?A JurisdictionalStudy, ELECTRICITY J., May 2005, at 11, 14.
175 See generally PowerPoint: Christopher Sherry, N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) Allocation Approach: Achieving Least-Cost Reductions
Through a Consumer Allocation Framework, Presentation at the Meeting of the Economic and
Allocation Advisory Committee 5-6 (July 1, 2009), available at http'I/www.climate
change. ca.gov/eaac/meetings/2009-07-01/documents/PresentationChristopherSherryRegional_
GreenhouseGas InitiativeRGG.pdf (explaining the market rationale for incorporating carbon
compliance costs into wholesale power market prices).
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Another solution, which seems necessary as we put in place any
infrastructure to encourage the development of renewable resources, will be
for voluntary coordination between state authorities or regional
transmission offices (RTOs) in pricing transmission, or for FERC to price
transmission. While transmission pricing will need to incorporate efficiency
goals in order to avoid overcapacity, transmission pricing also may need to
incorporate climate change goals and the preferences for different
generation technologies, including renewable sources, in different regions of
the country. For example, since many renewable resources, such as wind,
will require additional transmission capacity over their fossil fuel
alternatives,17, transmission pricing based purely on physical congestion may
leave wind at a serious economic disadvantage. In order for renewable
energy resources to have economic access to transmission in ways that will
allow them to compete with traditional fossil fuels, they may need more
transmission resources than their alternatives. Pricing mechanisms will need
to incorporate reserve margins for different fuel sources that are neutral to
the carbon content of the fuel used to generate electricity. This is probably
best achieved through a reserve subsidy built into the pricing mechanism,
although whether this is paid for by federal regulators, state regulators, or
regional bodies will depend on the shape of the institutional pricing authority.
In addition to state legal barriers, there are broader governance
barriers-at the levels of federal and regional governance-to the evolution
of the public interest to accommodate new transmission pricing issues.
A heightened role for regional coordination seems inevitable, as the
Waxman-Markey bill envisions. 177However, the precise form of regional
governance bodies and the role states will play in the regional governance
process seems quite uncertain. The uncertainty associated with governance
decisions in planning and siting transmission-that is, who, precisely, will
make decisions-alone may make it difficult for the extant legal regime to
attract the kind of capital necessary to sufficiently expand the transmission
grid to allow states to fully take advantage of export and import opportunities.
A purely state-led approach to coordination, such as the'Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in the Eastern United States,171 may
provide a model. However, this approach may lack the certainty of a binding
legal regime and may be subject to the same kinds of legal challenges that
have recently been mounted against the RGGI." 9 As an alternative, a top
down regional planning and siting process, which is led by federal principles

176

See supraPart V.B.1.

177

See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Waxman-Markey bill).

Information regarding the RGGI is available at RGGI, Inc., Welcome, http://www.rggi.org/
home (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). As. Steven Ferrey discussed, implementation of the RGGI
presents a host of potential constitutional and legal barriers. Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fre:
Potential ConstitutionalImpediments to the Regulation of Global Warming, 35 EcoLOGY LQ. 835,
839-41 (2008) (discussing various possible constitutional issues with state-led initiatives to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions).
179 See, e.g, Petition and Complaint at 1, Indeck Corinth, L.P. v. Paterson, RA No. 2009/0369
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 2009).
178
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such as those endorsed in Waxman-Markey,"" may produce a more uniform
set of principles to guide governance and overcome some of the obstacles of
a purely state-led approach to regional coordination. Even this, however, is
not without its costs, as to truly be effective, any regional body must
engender a sufficient common purpose of cooperation among its
stakeholders to overcome the strong incentives an individual state may face
in defecting to the in-state benefits that have predominated in the
conventional public utility paradigm.
Associated with a move to interstate governance models are even more
complicated questions associated with cost sharing. From a rate-making
perspective, the costs of transmission infrastructure are best spread among
all of its beneficiaries, whether they are located in or out of state. The
conventional public utility model poses a formidable barrier to such a costsharing principle. A recent report by the Center for American Progress states
the problem as follows:
Under typical practices for financing electrical transmission... the costs of
projects are paid for principally by the ratepayers in the particular area where
the project is built. This policy creates a strong disincentive for utilities and
their state regulators to invest in transmission that will have broader social
benefits that extend beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, due to our
system of cost recovery, as a nation we have underinvested in the backbone
electrical grid, relative to the benefits it could provide. Moving forward, the
costs of future investments in the national clean-energy smart grid will need to
be shared differently, reflecting the broadly dispersed environmental and
economic benefits that these projects will generate for our country.' '
Because the primary beneficiaries are not located entirely in the state in
which many transmission facilities will be built, the state rate-making
process alone will likely prove insufficient as a mechanism for facilitating
such cost sharing.
Cost-sharing principles will need to evolve in ways that transcend
individual state regulators, also presenting new governance challenges. One
solution may be to encourage cost sharing as a voluntary governance
principle between utilities at the regional level. For example, the Western
Electricity Coordination Council (WECC), formed in 2002, provides an
opportunity for such coordination.' Through standard tariffs terms, WECC
can provide a set of principles to assist state regulators in ensuring that cost
allocation principles are not overly parochial and that there is not a

180 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 151 (as passed
by House, June 26, 2009).
181 BRACKEN HENDRICKS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WIRED FOR PROGRESS: BUILDING A NATIONAL
CLEAN-ENERGY SMART GRID 24 (2009),

2009/02/pdf/electricity-grid.pdf.
182 W. Elec. Coordinating Council,
default.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).

available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
About

WECC,

http://www.wecc.biz/About/Pages/
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significant mismatch between the benefits of new transmission
and those
84
who pay for it, whether they are located in or out of state.'
Other solutions include more formalized arrangements or an expansion
of federal power. Although under current institutions they may not be a
sufficient solution in some areas of the country, such as within the Western
Interconnection or in Florida, independent system operators (ISOs) and
regional transnission organizations (RTOs) hold some promise as a model
for cost sharing in other parts of the country.184 Even their cost-sharing
mechanisms have proved problematic.'
According to the Center for
American Progress, "[elven in RTOs and ISOs with cost-allocation
mechanisms and benefits analysis, cost-allocation decisions are often
protracted and contentious. " 186 An RTO or an ISO may be insufficient as a
mechanism for cost sharing where the benefits accrue beyond the RTO or
ISO to a broader set of beneficiaries.
Finally, as a last resort, if states and regional bodies cannot sufficiently
address the issue on their own, cost sharing may become an issue of federal
regulation. In part, FERC maintains that this is because it lacks sufficient
legal authority to do so and it is lobbying Congress to expand its power to
more affirmatively build transmission costs into its own price setting
authority. According to FERC Chairman Wellinghoff:
Under FPA Sections 205 and 206, the Commission ensures that public
utilities' (investor-owned utilities) rates, terms and conditions of transmission
service in interstate commerce are just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. This responsibility includes allocating the costs
of new transmission facilities built by public utilities. At present, the
Commission has greater ability to assign such costs over broad geographic
areas where there is a regional transmission organization (RTO) or independent
system operator (ISO).
If Congress determines that there are broad public interest benefits in
developing the ...transmission system necessary to accommodate the Nation's
renewable energy potential, and therefore that the costs of transmission
facilities needed to meet our renewable energy potential should be fairly spread
to a broad group of energy users (for example across a region or an entire
interconnection), then Congress should consider giving the Commission clear

183 See W. ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL, BYLAWS OF THE WESTERN ELECTRICITY COORDINATING

COUNCIL 36 (2009) (providing bylaw requirement that members offer transmission service to
other members without respect to in- or out-of-state status).
184

See generalyISO/RTO CoUNcIL, THE VALUE

OF INDEPENDENT REGIONAL GRID OPERATORS

7

(2005), availableat http://www.isorto.org/atf/cf%7B5B4E85C6-7EAC-40A0-8DC3-003829518EBD
%7DNalue_ofIndependentRegionalGridOperators.pdf (discussing the values of RTO and
ISO transmission organizations).
185 Edward N. Krapels, The Angle of Repose in ElectricityRestuctUring: The.2003 Energy
Act, FERC,and the Outlook for TransmissionInvestment 17 ELECTRICITY J. 16, 18 (2004).
186 HENDRICKS, supm note 181, at 22.
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authority to allocate such transmission costs to1 all
load-serving entities within
7
an interconnection or part of an interconnection.
While FERC has not exactly been a leader in articulating an effective
set of cost-sharing principles for transmission, FERC sees its current
jurisdiction as limited. Whether it will remain so depends on whether
Congress sees the current state- or regional-based approaches to allocating
the costs of transmission and pricing it as sufficient.
V. CONCLUSION

While there is some evidence that state approaches to siting
transmission are beginning to evolve, the concern that transmission line
siting cannot be sufficiently handled at the state level alone is also
legitimate. State transmission siting statutes do not provide an adequate
legal mechanism to ensure the consideration of regional benefits and, to the
extent in-state benefits predominate as the driving factor for siting decisions,
will stand as a significant barrier to planning and constructing new highvoltage transmission facilities to transport power from renewable sources.
Regional compacts or some expansion of federal authority will probably be
necessary in some areas of the United States. However, this Article has
argued that expanding federal authority over transmission line siting aloneas those who invoke the superhighway analogy to electricity transmission
typically advocate-is not a panacea to state regulatory obstacles to new
transmission infrastructure. At the extreme, this Article has argued expanding
federal authority to allow transmission line siting without a full assessment of
its costs and benefits, reflected in the anticipated price purchasers will pay for
transmission, can undermine climate change goals.
Unlike the federal superhighway system, which provides free public
access to taxpayer-subsidized roads, electricity power transmission
infrastructure is largely financed by private investors.'" Thus, to be
successful, any federal clarification of siting authority must be coupled with
clearer authority over transmission pricing and a pricing policy that does
not encourage wasteful construction of transmission or reserve pricing
that is uneconomic to renewable sources. Indeed, there is some reason to
think that, if we could sort out the pricing issue, providing clearer
incentives for investors, interest groups would also have greater certainty
about what, precisely, is at stake for economic development in the siting
process. At the core, clearer incentives for private investors could prove
more important than who makes the decision about siting and eminent
domain at the public level.

187 Transmission IfrastrctureHearing,supra note 120, at 12 (testimony of Jon Wellinghoff,
Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
188 HYmAN, supra note 11, at 6; Fed. Highway Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Dwight D.
Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
programadmin/interstate.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
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